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ABSTRACT  
 
This literature review attempts to synthesize existing research of black swan 
phenomenon. Using a systematic methodology, a total of 66 key articles are identified as 
relevant. A framework is developed for black swans, which studies theoretical aspects of 
black swans, black swans’ effects and protection against black swans. The results show 
that there are only few black swan related studies and main focus should be creating a 
common theoretical ground work for black swan concept which should lead to more 
efficient prevention and protection studies, which is most vital study direction regarding 
black swans. The results also suggest that black swans work in complex and systematic 
manner and the effects can spread to other systems directly or indirectly. Study also 
highlights possible teleological aspects of black swan events. The study also notices that 
prior black swan related research which is not connected to current black swan research 
should be actively collected and added to current black swan research to eliminate 
potential unnecessary research. The thesis concludes by offering some theoretical and 
managerial implications.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
People have always had looked for ways to anticipate the future. The process of 
registering changes in the environment and using them to understand a causality chain 
that would reveal the next event is one of the basic function of human brain. It has been 
one of the humankind’s evolutionary advantage comparing to other animals. People use 
foresight for their own benefit. In early days, it helped people to survive where it now 
mostly prepares us to upcoming changes which happens now a day more frequently but 
ordinarily do not have same kind of “do or die” mentality than in the past.  
 
From people, foresighting has spread everywhere and in the modern society, there 
probably are not many capable organizations that do not use foresighting at least at some 
level to gain advantage. Even though our brain is almost design to foresee future events 
and we have created systems which single purpose is to forecasting what happens in the 
future, we are often, if not most times, really bad at it. When forecast goes wrong and is 
followed by a minor event, outcomes are also minor. But when the event is major or 
extreme, outcomes can be devastating. Especially since, the outcome can start a chain 
reaction which affects far in the future. What is even worse, the event itself, like 9/11 
attacks, might seem like a predictable event and afterwards they might look preventable. 
 
Nassim Taleb examines rare and extreme events in his book, The Black Swan: The Impact 
of the Highly Improbable, and gives his own explanation concerning why people do fail 
to foresee major events which have broad consequences even thought at hindsight they 
make almost perfect sense. Taleb calls these events as black swans. Taleb’s book’s first 
edition was released in 2007 and got its boost from the 2007-2008 financial crash. Even 
though, the Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable is, according to its author, 
more philosophical opus than a scientific script, it still draws the attention of academic 
world. Taleb construct his book in a way where he first introduces his own world view 
and simultaneously explains what is a black swan. 
 
Taleb’s bestseller has gotten influences from several thinkers, from mathematicians and 
philosophers to economists and all the way to his grandfather’s chauffer (Taleb 2013: 45, 
92). Taleb is not trying to take the credit of the concept of black swans to himself, and 
admits the topic have been in a conceptual discourse way back 1800’s (Follain 2013). But 
it’s unquestionable fact that Taleb has brought them to the knowledge of the great masses. 
He even named his book after Karl Popper’s metaphor of black swan, which views human 
incapability to believe certain thing before they are proved, in this context meaning actual 
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black swans that were discovered in Australia in (Bogle 2008). Black swan is also heavily 
related Frank Knights epistemological concept of uncertainty (Davidson 2010).  
 
To understand black swan phenomena, we must understand the world same way as 
Nassim Taleb sees it. One of the first things what can see from Taleb’s work is his strong 
disbelief of determinism. He praises Henri Poincaré and makes sure that he is known as 
early discoverer of chaos mechanics before Edward Lorenz (Taleb 2013:223). He also 
notes how world is dynamic (Taleb 2013:226). These examples of complex system 
basically denounce the Newtonian world view in Taleb’s mind. World is chaotic, 
nonlinear and dynamic. (Taleb 2013:126). Taleb believes that there is no destiny and all 
events are caused by a random chance. He offers several black swan events which were 
caused by random factors, like how Titanic sank or Fleming discovering penicillin. By 
this, Taleb points out how important invents are sometimes caused by accident (Taleb 
2013:214), accepting the possibility of a random event could be describe as a cornerstone 
to black swan concept.  
 
Taleb defines a Black Swan as a highly improbable event with three characteristics: It’s 
totally unpredictable, its impact is massive and it’s amenable to explanation, after it has 
happened. (Heinonen and Ruotsalainen 2013:304). Meaning that in retrospective black 
swan seems predictable, not random (Sniedovich 2012). The author explains that we are 
good at predicting the ordinary, but not good at predicting the irregular and that big 
events, while opportunities are almost always irregular or eccentric (Dollinger 2008). He 
has questioned the ability of people in general as well as of policymakers and regulators 
to seek appropriate protection from a category of events that they consistently overlook 
(Terzi 2010). Black Swan events cannot either be predicted from historical trends and 
they often surprise managers with discontinuities (Millett 2010). According to Taleb, 
there is no meaningful forecasting method due to a chaotic world where reality is shaped 
by rare black swans. (Werther 2013). He thinks Black Swans are unfair and damaging. 
“He would like to eliminate many of them, or at least diminish their impact. But he 
stresses that the world today is dominated by the unknown and improbable, and promises 
that the future will be even less predictable” (Dollinger 2008: 354). 
 
To be more precise, Taleb offers five reasons why people are unable to see black swans 
before they happen. First, due to a conformation bias we concentrate our attention to 
possibilities which are previously discovered and are general. Second, a narrative 
perception where people improperly interprets observation due to an unintentional biases 
view. Third, people act like there are no black swans because human nature was not 
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“programmed” to detect them. Four, some black swans do not leave any evidence, due to 
lack of them the probability of black swans are misjudged. Five, people concentrate to 
well-defined sources of uncertainty and concentrate list of black swans which have 
already happened while missing upcoming swans which are harder to discover (Taleb 
2013:84).  
 
Taleb’s key message, in his book, is that forecasting is rarely possible. Forecasting is 
based on historic data, and developed through a mindset shaped by experience that often 
is prejudice, because human nature seeks certainty and reassurance (Lloyd 2008). Instead 
of preventing them, Taleb suggest, planning our actions so their impact can be minimized. 
He offers 10 metaphoric principles, for building systems that are robust to black swan 
events: “1. What is fragile should break early while it is still small. Nothing should ever 
become too big to fail. 2. No socialization of losses and privatization of gains. 3. People 
who were driving a school bus blindfolded (and crashed it) should never be given a new 
bus. 4. Do not let someone making an ‘‘incentive’’ bonus manage a nuclear plant – or 
your financial risks. 5. Counterbalance complexity with simplicity. 6. Do not give 
children sticks of dynamite, even if they come with a warning. 7. Only Ponzi schemes 
should depend on confidence. Governments should never need to ‘‘restore confidence.’’ 
8. Do not give an addict more drugs if he has withdrawal pains. 9. Citizens should not 
depend on financial assets or fallible ‘‘expert’’ advice for their retirement. 10. Make an 
omelette with the broken eggs.” (Sniedovich 2012). Taleb’s intentions to stop using 
resources to identifying black swan for preventing them and start concentrating to 
minimize their effects can be seen more clearly in a 2012 interview where he told, “My 
whole idea of the black swan is to stop looking for black swans and analyze the fragility 
and robustness of systems” (Milner 2017). 
 
 
1.1 Research problem and justification  
 
This thesis will study extreme and rare events, which are difficult to foresee. The main 
purpose is to collect and synthesize the core literature of such events. It will be done by 
setting Nassim Taleb’s black swan as a benchmark concept. Black swan is chosen to be 
the corner concept of this thesis since it’s currently one of the most well-known and 
popular concept which examines extreme and rare event which are difficult to foresee. 
Even though black swan and other similar concepts are known at least at name level by 
the great masses, the cap between popular level knowledge and theoretical level 
understanding is often major. Understanding black swans and the possibility of rapidly 
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changing environment should help every organization to prepare for the future. Outside 
of the cap between common understanding and understanding the mechanics causing 
black swans, topic’s literature is also fragmented and there are no practical guidelines 
which literature should be included to the topic and which should be excluded from it. 
Collecting and synthetizing major themes and different concepts under one study will 
help to understand the phenomena and help the future research of the topic.       
 
 
1.2 Purpose of the study 
 
The study presented in this thesis is conducted as a systematic and critical literature 
review. The purpose of this study is to synthesize current literature on black swans in 
relevant parts and analyze how it is received. This will be done by identifying, selecting, 
reading, and summarizing 66 key articles published in scientific journals. Following this, 
an integrative framework is created which demonstrates how black swans theoretical 
concept is seen at the field, how black swan’s effect affect afterwards, and is it possible 
for organization to protect itself against black swan. This thesis contributes to the 
development of the black swan literature by examining current black swan research to 
synthetize chosen themes of literature and expanding the black swan definition by 
recognize similar concepts which are currently left, as whole or partially, outside side of 
the black swan.  
 
 
1.3 Delimitation and structure of the study 
 
This study include following delimitations. The study will be limited primarily to black 
swans and related concepts in economics, management and related fields, meaning black 
swan phenomenon which do not affect in these fields will be delimited outside of this 
literature review. This will be done mainly by limiting search terms to economics related 
searches in chosen databases. Findings which do pass the limitations but do not meet the 
previous requirements will be concluded to the study to ensure the repeatability of this 
study. Terms similar to black swans which do have limited results will be searched 
without previously mentioned economics related criteria. This is done to be sure that any 
potential findings will not be left outside of the study due too strict limitation regarding 
samples. The study will also be limited to first extraction, meaning later identified 
concepts, which are similar to black swans will not lead additional searches in this study 
but do offer a better starting point for future studies.           
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Study’s structure is as follows. First, the methodology of the search is presented which 
shows how the relevant literature was identified. Next, the literature is reviewed to 
identify significant themes in it. Next, a framework is designed and based on most 
important themes and explained. Following this, the framework is used to describe 
previous literature and attempts are made to synthesize extant research. This helps to 
explore existing findings and provides a good starting point for focusing future research 
efforts, which is the topic of the next chapter. Finally, the article concludes by offering 
both theoretical and managerial implications.  
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
 
Building a systematic review on black swan turned out to be a challenging process due to 
a relatively fresh concept of the black swan. Taleb’s book is quite recent and, even though 
it has produced considerably conversation in last ten years, it still has relatively little 
actual material for a systematic review. Another challenge rose from finding material 
which is similar to Taleb’s black swan concept, but which does not use black swan label. 
This material includes publications that appeared before Taleb’s book and material which 
just for some other reason does not use black swan label.  
 
To identify the focal literature outside black swan concept, the Taleb’s book itself was 
read to set the limitations for searches. According to Taleb, black swans have three 
distinguishing characteristics. First the event is unfamiliar sighting because it’s outside 
of the regular expectations. Second, it will have extreme impact. Third, after the event 
has happened people start to be reasoning why and how the event happened to make it 
explainable and predictable. (Taleb 2013:16). In another word, a black swan event has 
low probability, high impact and cannot be noticed before it happens.  
 
Using black swan’s description, HILP-events was recognized as a one of similar concept 
for black swan. HILP-events are high impact low probability events (Paltnieri and Renier 
2017). Besides HILP, also same meaning terms “high impact low probability” and “low 
probability high impact” was added to the search list. Outside HILP-events, there was 
not recognized any other concepts which were closely related to black swan events at this 
point, so it was decided that the rest of data was going to be searched by hand, using 
topics which were heavily related to main points of black swan.  
 
Terms “black swan*”, “HILP”, “high impact low probability”, “low probability high 
impact”, “risk assessment” and “emerging risk” was chosen to be the search terms. 
Scopus and Web of Science were chosen as the databases for the search. “Risk 
assessment” and “emerging risks” were chosen as search topics due to black swan’s 
heavy links to unpredictability and extreme outcomes. Common terms “risk assessment” 
and “emerging risk”, did produce excessive amount of hits, due to this reason, a second 
layer term “management” was added to narrow down findings with “risk assessment” and 
“emerging risk” terms. Terms “black swan*”, “risk assessment” and “emerging risk” was 
chosen to be searched including categories business, management and economics in Web 
of Knowledge –database and including categories Busi and Econ in Scopus-database. Due 
to a relatively low number of finding with terms “hilp”, “high impact low probability” 
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and “low probability high impact” there was no need for additional filter for them. The 
search when the literature was extracted was done in September 2017. 
 
The screening of the material was decided to do in four phases. First, all the selected terms 
were searched with possible topic or inclusion filters. The purpose of the first phase was 
to gather all of the articles together which included at least one of the aforementioned key 
words. None of the articles was not excluded in first phase. At the second phase, all 
articles were screened by their name and articles which heavily implied not to be related 
to the topic were removed. Articles which were at least partially related or could not be 
identified by title were included to next screening. There were massive amount of 
accounting related articles which did not fit for the limitations and were discarded at the 
second screening. These articles were  found under search terms “risk assessment” or 
“emerging risk”. In hindsight, excluding topics like “accounting” would have speed up 
the screening process significantly but at least used method did not compromise the 
quality of the extracted literature. There were also handful of “HILP” related articles 
which were excluded due their “HILP” did not refer to “high impact low probability” but 
to a medical term “Hyperthermic Isolation Limp Perfusion”. The duplicates were also 
removed at the second screening. In a third screening, articles’ abstract were read and 
again unfit articles were excluded. Often the deciding factor was, what kind of risks did 
the article studied. If the studied risk was outside of black swan’s definition the article 
was rejected. If the type risk was not specified in the abstract, the article was included to 
the last phase of screening. At the time, “risk assessment” and “emerging risk” related 
articles were the majority and most of them were unfit for the systematic review, so 
special attention was paid to recognize unfit articles under those search terms to reduce 
the number of articles to be read. In the fourth screening, all of remaining articles were 
read completely and either was rejected or accepted to the systematic review.  
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Table 1: Search Results from the Databases 
 
Database Step # Left 
Web of Science Initial search 601 
 After exclusion by title 195 
 After exclusion by abstract 40 
   
Scopus Initial search 4496 
 After exclusion by title 391 
 After exclusion by abstract 146 
   
Combined articles Selected to be read 186 
 Accepted to systematic review 66 
    
In the initial search, the large number of the findings can be explained by the excessive 
quantity of findings of “risk assessment” and “emerging risk” related hits which were 
not connected to black swans in anyway. Another noteworthy observation is the amount 
of the articles which were rejected after reading. Most of them were initially found by 
search term “risk assessment” or “emerging risk” and could not be rejected without 
reading the article. Ten articles which were rejected after the reading were book reviews, 
three were rejected due a low quality and two articles were rejected because black swans 
were incorrectly mentioned in the title but the article itself did not dealt with the subject 
of black swans.  
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the extracted literature 
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      Yes (2) 
 
 
 No (66) 
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Is it book review? 
Is it duplicate? 
Rejection by name 
Rejection by abstract 
Does the text study black 
swans or related topic? 
Is it low quality? 
Is it wrongly titled? 
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3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The material was first read to identify possible themes for the framework itself. The goal 
was to find two or three themes which would offer a pragmatic view for the systematic 
review. After the material was read, there was identified three suitable subjects for further 
reviewing: Theoretical aspects (A), effects (B) and protection against black swans (C).  
 
After identifying of the relevant studies, all included articles were read and information 
on the type of research, sample size, sample characteristics, connections and key findings 
were extracted. Doing so, special attention was paid to how the studies connected to each 
other which was an essential step to synthetize black swan literature by themes.  
 
While chapter will briefly outline the different aspects of black swans that have been 
identified and how relevant studies have connected to each other’s, the next chapter will 
explore these results more in depth. 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical context 
 
First topic which was identified from literature was the need for specific theoretical 
ground for black swan. During its relatively short existence, Taleb’s concept has received 
a massive amount of attentions and it has faced both agreement and critique (e.g., Follain 
2013; Millett 2010, Mueller and Stewart 2016; Werther 2013) but the deeper problem 
might be in the need for a scientific approach to the topic (e.g., Bogle 2008; Allington, 
McCombie and Pike 2017; Booth and Mazzawi 2008).  
 
One interesting note from literature is how problematic is to categorize the book. Even 
though Taleb adds disclaimer that the book is philosophical opus, it is often viewed 
almost as a scientific research and so, its methods and outcomes are questioned. Some 
blame for this could be pointed toward Taleb’s education and career. A person who has 
worked as a professor in several respected universities and is a stock broker is likely taken 
as more scientific minded person. Regardless the usefulness of arguing with a Taleb’s 
philosophical view, it could be meaningful to examine the theory of black swan events 
and study, could it be applied to understand how the black swans work in a concrete 
world. 
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Taleb has expanded both his book and the black swan concept from the first edition and 
has tried to regard some critique in his second edition and these changes could be 
interesting aspect for closer view. 
 
 
3.2 Black swan’s effect 
 
Another aspect which rose from literature was how black swans affect after they have 
happened. Due to Taleb’s notes that black swans cannot be prevented, this is an important 
aspect to the systematic review.  
 
There is large interest toward black swans in financial sector. Numbers of researches have 
tried to find out how black swans affect to market prices and are there any way to protect 
against them (e.g., Ajmi, El-montasser, Hammoudeh and Nguyen 2014; Almudhaf and 
AlKulaib 2017; Estrada 2009; Olson, Miller and Wohar 2012; Taylor and Williams 
2009). Market point of view might not provide any findings related concrete world, but 
it’s still part of literature and may provide useful financial aspects. Also, the effect toward 
consumer goods and supply chains has been studied (e.g., Olson and Wu 2013; Siomkos 
1999). These studies are not directly connected to black swans, but their mechanics may 
offer useful aspect for later research. 
 
Another aspect identified from effect has to be similarities between HILP-events and 
natural catastrophe black swans (e.g., Carsamer 2016; Chawla, Mangaliso, Knipes and 
Gauthier 2012; Knudsen 2010; Paltrinieri et al. 2017; Rheinberger and Treich 2017). 
These cases are not the black swans the great audience is used to see if compared to 
terrorist attack or financial crash black swans, but their affect can be similar (Olsen et al. 
2013) and even Taleb himself have noticed their existent in his book (Taleb 2013: 282, 
372), so they are inevitable part of black swan’s concept. 
 
 
3.3 Protection against black swans 
 
Questioning can black swans be prevented is a useful question. According to Taleb, black 
swans cannot be prevented (Taleb 2013: 223, 264). The question divides opinion in the 
literature which makes it even more meaningful question for the systematic review. 
Scholars like Bogle (2008) shares Taleb’s opinion where e.g. Follain (2013), Werther 
 18 
(2013) sees the it differently. In the literature, prevention question transforms to, can 
black swans be seen, which will decide should organizations to passively protect 
themselves against possible black swans or should they actively try to search them and 
maybe even try to prevent them. 
 
Another useful point of view for this part will be additional methodologies which 
examines similar question like black swans. This part’s intension is to bring up possible 
alternative tool which might be useful for finding black swans. 
 
In sum, the research can be summarized by stating that there is a total of three groups of 
articles within the developed framework. First group views theoretical aspects of black 
swan concept. Second group examines black swan’s effect and how they affect after the 
event has happened. Last group examines, could black swan events be prevented 
somehow. Table contains an overview of all the studies that were included in the sample. 
The table shows the type of paper (qualitative, quantitative, conceptual, et cetera), the 
sample size and the characteristics, group connections in the systematic review and the 
key findings.  
 
  (text continues on page 36) 
 
 
Table 2: Studies and Key Findings 
No. Article Type Sample size Sample Characteristic Connec-
tions 
Key findings 
01 Ajmi, El-
montasser, 
Hammoudeh & 
Nguyen (2014) 
 
Qualitative 
 
- 11 countries 
- 11 MENA countries 
- Daily oil prices from 
2.7.2007 to 27.8.2012 
- B -Oil prices and MENA stock markets 
interact in a nonlinear manner. 
- The signs of changes in the causing 
variables are important for detecting the 
true causality links between the variables. 
-  The nonlinear causality is more 
pronounced in the case of the Brent than 
West Texas Intermediate oil prices. 
02 Akkermans & 
Wassenhove 
(2013) 
Conceptual   - A, C - Grey swans will be increased  
- Importance of understanding grey swan 
business tsunami 
-4 ways avoid grey swans: 1. Early 
spotting, 2. Fast decision-making, 3. Agile 
supply network, 4. Focused research 
03 Aleskerov & 
Egorova (2012) 
Quantitative  - Returns of the stock 
index S&P500 from 
August 1999 to 
December 2009 
- C - Black swans cannot be detected with 
article’s model, grey swans can be. 
- Detecting grey swans brings a small profit 
in long run.  
04 Allington, 
McCombie & 
Pike (2017) 
Conceptual  
 
 
 
 
 - A -  The subprime crisis could have been 
predictable by anyone with a detailed 
knowledge of financial markets and the 
LTCM crisis. 
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05 Almudhaf & 
AlKulaib (2017) 
Qualitative -4 investment 
quality metal’s 
daily prices in 
US dollars 
-  Gold, silver and S&P 
500 from January 
1968 to March 2016. 
Platinum and 
palladium from April 
1990 to March 2016 
B - Black swans can affect to metals prices. 
- Metals do fluctuate, but value returns. 
- Timing is impossible to predict, buyers 
should hold all the time. 
06 Ashta (2016) Journal 
article/ 
Interview 
One 
organization 
Microcredit 
organization in India 
A, B - Black swans can be government made 
 -Black swans can be teleological 
(politicians) 
 - Black swans are very difficult to 
limit/control 
 
07 Bekiros, 
Boubaker, Ngyen 
& Uddin (2017) 
Quantitative  - BRICS countries 
stock portfolio 
- 3-month gold future 
prices 
B - Investing in gold is becoming more 
popular and it reduce fluctuation in the 
long run. 
- Gold acts as a diversifier both normal and 
bear markets in the BRICS countries, but it 
is not a hedge or a safe haven. 
 
08 Bogle (2008) Journal 
article 
  A, C - Black swans are unavoidable 
09 Booth & 
Mazzawi (2008) 
Journal 
article 
  
 
 
 
 
A - 2007 financial crisis was not a black 
swan, but combined fault of different 
parties. It was seen in some form before 
actualization by many. 
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10 Borisom & 
Hamm (2010) 
Journal 
article 
  A - Fact-alone perspective provides no 
effective guidance on issues where there 
are little or no frequency data 
- Unlimited faith in historical data leads to 
overconfidence and excessive risk taking 
- A system based solely on historical fact 
inevitably lurches from crisis to crisis 
- The Bayesian perspective provides more 
accurate and powerful results regardless 
the amount and quality of the data 
11 Carmeli & 
Schaubroeck 
(2008) 
Qualitative - 30 managers - Snowball sampling 
method 
- 217 companies, 
75,5% private 
companies 
- two-step research 
model 
A, C - Learning is a critical component to crisis 
management   
- Managers should remove employee 
actions toward failure which were 
previously effective, but which have now 
proven to be false 
- learning from failures is critical to 
organization's crisis-preparedness, it may 
help to identify weak signals 
- previous crisis might make organization's 
more tolerant to future crisis 
12 Carsamer (2016) Literature 
review & 
quantitative 
Five countries: 
South Africa, 
Egypt, Nigeria, 
Ghana and 
Kenya 
-  Regional bilateral 
trade rate sample 
period from first 
quarter of 1990 to 
2013 final quarter 
-  Currency US dollars 
- Data from IMF 
B - Exchange rate co-movement for 
economies that depend predominantly on 
trade is high, and such economies are 
riskier and less resilient to crisis. 
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13 Chawla, 
Mangaliso, 
Knipes & 
Gauthier (2012) 
Literature 
reviw 
 - Historic literature 
review 
A - Modern technology adds information 
and capital flows which may increase 
fluctuation  
14 Christiansen & 
Thrane (2014) 
Qualitative 23 managers - Data from monthly 
risk update meetings 
- Military and civil 
managers 
- 1-year worth of 
monthly risk reports  
C - Risk reports communicate information 
between organizational levels, but 
frontline managers can add a political 
nuance to risk, so which should be noticed 
 
15 Davidson (2010) Conceptual   A - Nassim Taleb’s “black swan” argument 
regarding uncertainty is equivalent to 
Frank Knight’s epistemological concept of 
uncertainty 
16 Davidson (2012) Conceptual   A - Risk managers should realize understand 
the economic system is nonergodic 
- A market-maker institution that is 
trustworthy and has sufficient resources 
provides security 
17 Dietz (2011) Qualitative  Empirical examination 
of key theoretical 
points using a 
probabilistic 
integrated 
assessment model 
B, C - Economic analysis of climate change 
depends greatly on low-probability, high-
impact events 
- A regional catastrophes are likelier than a 
global 
- Regions most likely to suffer a 
catastrophe are India and Southeast Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East, and Latin 
America, the only region to escape a 
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catastrophe altogether is the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
- There are several other potential 
catastrophes which are much less noticed 
18 Ding, Gerst, 
Bernstein, 
Howarth & 
Borrsuk (2012) 
Quantitative - 24/16 nations 
 
Long-annual data on 
growth in real per 
capita personal 
consumer 
expenditure for 24 
nations and on asset 
returns for 16 nations 
C - society is substantially more averse to 
risk than typically assumed in integrated 
assessment models 
- Risk preferences vary among nations.  
- Higher aversion to risk increases HILP-
event prevention 
19  Emblemsvåg 
(2008) 
Quantitative One case study - Åknes case study 
- Monte Carlo 
method used to 
estimate the pro-
bability of accident 
C - Limited data of natural disaster do affect 
the accuracy of predictions 
 
20 Estrada (2009) Quantitative  Dow Jones Industrial 
Average Index 
between 1900-2006 
B - Large daily swings that have a significant 
impact on long- term performance 
- Black swans have a massive impact on 
long-term performance 
21 Feduzi & Rundle 
(2014) 
Conceptual   C Bacon’s method offers rational procedure 
for exploring possibilities. It shows how 
the processes of generating and evaluating 
hypotheses can play supporting roles. It 
provides the resources for developing 
prescriptive approaches to state space 
construction and that may help make 
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inroads on the problem of organizations 
being blindsided by black swan. 
22 Flage & Aven 
(2015) 
Qualitative  Theoretical risk 
classification by 
literature 
A, C - Black swans can be subjective 
-  Unknown unknowns and unknown 
knowns have been linked to black swan 
type of events and known unknowns to 
emerging risks 
23 Follain (2013) Qualitative/ 
Conceptual 
Case study Case study of relevant 
literature 
A, C - Taleb’s overly simplistic narratives could 
be addressed by people outside the field 
- Ongoing stress test and new adjusted 
rules to market could protect against 
upcoming financial crisis (black swans) 
- More outlier research is needed 
24 Higgins (2013) Qualitative 20+ experts -Examines Black Swan 
events and tests imp-
act on the accuracy of 
short term forecasts 
-six month bi-annual 
survey of key 
Australian property 
-between 2005-2011 
C -  Statistical tests showed inconsistencies 
with the expert forecasts to actual 
performance 
-  All the experts appeared to miss the 
start of the Global Financial Crisis in the 
December 2008 
- At times, simple “no change” forecast 
was better than experts 
25 Hilal, Poon & 
Tawn (2011) 
Quantitative 1052 daily 
closing value 
- 1052 closing values 
for the S&P500 index 
-  from March 26, 
2004 to May 30, 2008 
C -  Approach can address losses outside the 
range of the historical data and, so, it is a 
useful technique for estimating hedge 
ratios that emphasize the downside risk of 
a portfolio 
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26 Hyung & Vries 
(2012) 
Quantitative  - Simulation using an 
estimate of the scale 
of the S&P 500 index 
as a representation 
for the market factor 
C - The fat tail phenomenon is well 
recognized and popularized as the black 
swan 
-  The fat tail feature produces more 
focused portfolios 
27 Ilevbare, Probert 
& Phaal (2012) 
Qualitative 5 case studies - In-depth semi-
structured interviews 
with roadmapping 
experts  
- Exercise from US, 
UK, Canada and 
Finland 
C -  To be more successful risk management 
must start with a consideration of 
uncertainty and go beyond the widely 
accepted and standard risk management 
process 
28 Jebari (2014) Conceptual   C - Engineers safety/safety barriers could 
provide answer to black swan extinction 
events 
29 Jovanović & Pilić 
(2017) 
Qualitative 19 risks - 19 Risk from 4 
different risk group in 
ERRA's (emerging risk 
representative 
applications) 
considered as sources 
of ‘multiple risks’ in 
iNTeg-Risk project 
B - The perceptions of ancillary risks and 
trade-offs are even more variable than the 
already often very contradictory 
perceptions of target risks directly 
pertinent to the respective technologies 
- The wish to develop and promote the 
technology in risk-adverse societies can 
result in blindness for ancillary risks 
- Paper’s framework deals with the trade-
offs of risks both in space and in time 
30 Knudsen (2010) Journal 
article 
 Environmental 
problems and black 
swan evaluated 
B - Environment movement may benefit 
from 2007 black swan financial crisis, if 
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through earlier non-
environmental black 
swan event 
global warming is seen as a similar event 
which should be taken seriously 
31 Langley (2013) Conceptual   C - SCAP is techniques designed to ensure 
preparedness for the ‘black swans’ of HILP 
events 
- Both bank stress testing and catastrophe 
planning are problematizations of the 
future that work primarily with 
uncertainties rather than risk probabilities 
32 Lettieri, Masella 
& Radaelli 
(2009) 
Systematic 
review 
- 56 articles Disaster management 
literature between 
1980-2006. Academic 
journals and peer-
reviewed published 
papers, excluding 
working papers and 
books. Both thematic 
and descriptive 
analysis 
A - Through both the analyses the authors 
argue for scholars in disaster management 
specific streams for further research and 
for providing practitioners with a state of 
art of disaster management discipline 
33 Lindaas & 
Pettersen (2017) 
Conceptual   A, C - It’s possible to predicting extraordinary 
high-impact events as unlike Taleb claims. 
A broadening of approaches, including like 
communication, can contribute to 
improved predictions. However, 
communication can work both ways.  
- De-blackening is possible, not always 
work 
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- Investment in predictive methods and 
techniques in no waste of resource 
34 Lockamy (2011) Qualitative 10 companies 10 casting suppliers 
to a major US 
automotive company 
C - Bayesian networks can be used as an 
effective benchmarking tool for decisions 
regarding current and prospective 
suppliers based upon their potential 
impact on the buyer organization 
35 Lockamy & 
McCormack 
(2012) 
Qualitative 15 companies 15 casting suppliers 
to a major US 
automotive company 
C Bayesian networks methodology can be 
used to develop supplier risk profiles to 
determine the risk exposure of a 
company’s revenue stream. The supplier 
risk profiles can be used to determine 
which risk events which have the highest 
impact and probability. 
36 Makridakis, 
Hogarth & Gabe 
(2009) 
Conceptual   A, C - Subway and Coconut uncertainty, 
mixture also possible 
- Downgrading risks is in human nature 
- Assessing uncertainty: 1. Accepting the 
existence, 2. Assess the level, 3. Augment 
the range of uncertainty considered in the 
previous step  
37 Makridakis 
&Taleb (2009) 
Conceptual   A, C - Accurate forecast is possible but fails in 
complex system 
- People reaction affect to future outcomes 
- In low predictability: 1. Avoid the illusion 
of control, 2. Protective strategies, 3. 
Being prepared, 4. Proactive strategies, 5. 
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The VC approach, 6. The maxmin 
approach, 7. Concentrating on uncertainty 
- Globalism has changed world more 
volatile because events are combined 
38 Markmann, 
Darkow & 
Gracth (2012) 
Qualitative 80 experts - Online survey 
- Experts: 55 from 
industry, 16 from 
science and 9 from 
politics 
- Survey related to 
wicked problems 
C - Delphi method can assist in reducing 
uncertainty and thereby the companies' 
susceptibility and vulnerability to various 
kinds of disruptions 
39 Marsh & 
Pfleiderer (2012) 
Quantitative 
 
  
- S&P VIX index 
- 21 year period 
C - Black Swan surprise virtually disappears 
for S&P Index returns when it’s measured 
relative to the standard deviation of the 
conditional S&P distribution 
- Some models, enhanced information 
flows speed up contagion effects and 
systemic black swan events  
- Black swans are hardly immutable; nor 
does that moniker provide any insight is 
the becoming manageable or not 
40 Maslen & Hayes 
(2016) 
Conceptual   A, C - Black swans might be able to prevent via 
information sharing  
- Both the processes of mediation and 
synchronization require social practices to 
transfer, translate, transform, and 
distribute knowledge between people 
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41 Masys (2012) Qualitative 2 case studies - 2010 BP oil spill   
- 2011 tsunami 
nuclear accident 
-  cases analyzed 
through the lens of 
actor network theory 
C - Scenario planning and red teaming does 
not predict precise future, but bunch of 
them.  
- Black swan might not be revealed (grey 
swanned) 
42 Mikes (2011) Qualitative - 2 case studies 
 
- 5 major banks over 
2001-2010 
- 53 interviews 
A, C - Black swan has increased interest to risk 
management 
- Over the last decade, a growing number 
of practitioners and commentators have 
been recasting a firm’s strategic, IT, legal, 
and compliance uncertainties as additional 
and distinct risk categories 
 
43 Milanesi, 
Guercini & 
Waluszewski 
(2016) 
Qualitative 2 case studies -  paper utilizes 
published studies on 
the changes of the 
textile/fashion 
companies located to 
the Prato area in Italy 
A Change appears to be the product of 
antecedents affecting the dynamics of 
specific relations, which are an important 
factor in causing change in business 
activities; they may be positive or 
negative, but they are always decisive. 
Black Swan from the ID standpoint, 
appears less surprising when interpreted 
through an interactive approach, focused 
on the possibilities and constraints of 
relational processes across time and 
space. 
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44 Miller (2009) Literature 
review/ 
Conceptual 
 Organizational and 
sociocultural 
literature illustrate 
the possibilities for 
moving beyond 
modernist 
assumptions in 
organizational risk 
research 
A The directions discussed for future 
research encourage both theoretical and 
methodological innovations within 
organizational risk research 
45 Millett (2010) Journal 
article 
  A - Critique: Taleb underestimates the power 
of long term trends as a basis for strategic 
planning, discontinuities are no automatic. 
Scenarios are blandly jumped over, 
method for suckers 
- Adds to new edition: black swan is 
subjective and Investing in barbell strategy 
46 Mueller & 
Stewart (2016) 
Journal 
article 
  A - Describe how reactions to events decides 
if the event itself is transforming into black 
swans due to an aggressive reaction 
- Criticism toward Taleb’s view of social life 
being produced by sequential ”shocks and 
jumps”  
- Agrees with the importance of extreme 
events 
47 Nafday (2009) Conceptual   A, C - Black swans separated from grey swans 
- Presents: Prevention strategies, Risk-
Reduction strategies, Risk Transfer 
Strategies, Design-Based Strategies 
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48 O’Donnell (2005) Conceptual   C - Creates a system-thinking framework for 
COSO to identifying the various events 
that could hinder the ability of a business 
unit to achieve its operating objectives 
49 Olson & Wu 
(2013) 
Journal 
article/ An 
article 
review 
One case study - Review of 
Eyjafjallajökull 
volcano case study 
focusing how HILP 
can affect to 
organizations 
B - Highly optimized supply chain networks 
are inherently risky, in part because they 
eliminate most system slack in order to 
lower costs 
50 Olson, Miller & 
Wohar (2012) 
Quantitative 8 regions/ 
countries 
Bloombergs daily 
LIBOR-OIS Spread and 
a Global credit default 
swap (CDS) index 
between 1.1.2006-
31.8.2010 
B, C - Black swan appeared in smaller 
economies prior to that in large ones 
during financial crisis  
- Only shocks to the US LIBOR-OIS spread 
has any statistically significant effects after 
30 days 
51 Paltrinieri, 
Tugnoli, Buston, 
Wardman & 
Cozzani (2013) 
Conceptual   C - DyPASI features as a tool to support 
emerging risk management process, 
having the potentiality to contribute to an 
integrated approach breaking “vicious 
circles”, helping to trigger a gradual 
process of identification of previously 
unrecognized atypical scenarios. 
52 Paltrinieri, Khan 
& Cozzani 
(2015) 
Qualitative One case study The BP Texas City 
refinery accident in 
2005 
C - Need of safety culture and decision-
making processes capable to deal 
dynamically with emerging and increasing 
risk issues 
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- Capturing the dynamic evolution of 
internal and external risk conditions does 
not only support more effectively critical 
decisions of the industry sector, but also 
improve the general safety 
53 Paltrinieri & 
Reniers (2017) 
Conceptual  Studies dynamic risk 
analysis for Seveco 
sites 
C - Complementary methods addressing 
dynamic risk analysis on different levels, in 
order to make sense of the data collected: 
dynamic hazard identification, dynamic 
analysis of initiating events, and dynamic 
analysis of consequences 
54 Rheinberger & 
Treich (2017) 
Conceptual   B - Big catastrophes that are going to 
increase both in frequency and size 
- Some general risk assessments do not 
include important dimensions such as the 
sheer size of a catastrophe or the disutility 
of bereavement 
- General catastrophe aversion is 
questionable 
55 Räikkönen, Pilli-
Sihvola, Kunttu, 
Yliaho, Jähi, 
Zuccaro & 
Cogliano (2014) 
Qualitative Two case 
studies 
- Two pilot cases: 
Extreme winter storm 
in North of Finland 
and major earthquake 
in Italy.  
- Study is part of 
CRISMA project   
C  - Practical approach for the economic 
assessment of long-term mitigation 
investments for crisis management, 
designed to support planning and 
decision-making 
- Covers the influence of economic impacts 
of mitigation measures and uncertainty on 
decisions 
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56 Santos, Alves & 
Hammoudeh 
(2013) 
Qualitative  three unconditional 
EVT models based on 
the i.i.d. assumption 
 
C The recommendation to decision makers is 
that at times of extreme and rare events 
they should estimate market risk with HQ 
models such the DPOT and Quasi- Port 
models which perform well with very small 
probability values. 
 
57 Schurr, Rodensky 
& Erev (2014) 
Quantitative - 48 students - Participants used 
their show-up fee 
which they could lose  
- Their risk 
assessment were 
examined via several 
scenarios 
A, C - Study revealed two contradictory effects: 
direct studies of experienced utility reflect 
overweighting the peak (rare and most 
extreme) experience, but studies of 
decisions from experience reflect 
underweighting of the peak and reliance 
on the frequent experiences   
 
58 Sheffi  (2005) Journal 
article 
  C - Flexibility is important for companies to 
protect themselves against HILP-events 
 
59 Siomkos (1999) Quantitative - 384 
consumer 
Consumer had to 
have owned either or 
both products in last 
two years 
B - consumer links manufacturers reputation 
directly proportionally to product liability  
- taking responsibility reduce customers 
outrage toward company 
- consumers tend to hold the company 
less responsible if product re-call are made 
- a company which faces positive external 
effects during a crisis will be held the least 
responsible for the harm 
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60 Sniedovich 
(2012) 
Conceptual   A - Critique: Taleb’s solution to the Black 
Swan phenomenon is, to build the world 
so that it is resistant to Black Swans, 
hence, to forecast errors, in which case 
forecast errors, hence uncertainty, would 
become inconsequential 
61 Taylor & 
Williams (2009) 
Quantitative Several market 
and interest 
rates from 
September 
2006 to August 
Rates examined 
through recent no-
arbitrage models 
B - expectations of future interest rates and 
counter-party risk are major factors in 
explaining the spread between interest 
rates on lending and the overnight rate 
- Implications for future macroeconomic 
research 
- Implications for policy 
62 Terzi (2010) Conceptual   A - Outliers are always possible 
- Past observations are too small sample 
size to predict probability of extremely rare 
events 
- Outliers are risk to an investment 
portfolio or an entire banking system  
63 Trakas, 
Hatziargyriou, 
Panteli, 
Mancarella 
(2011) 
Quantitative Case study - Simulation in IEEE 
24-bus reliability test 
- Focuses on com-
puting the SRI of the 
transmission test 
system subject to 
severe windstorms 
- A simulation period 
of one day (includes 
the peak demand) 
C - Managing HILP events in power grid is 
possible with Severity Risk Index 
- Could open possibility to monitor for 
other HILP-events 
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64 Tzezana (2017) Qualitative 50 experts - Deconstructing 
wicked problems into 
core components, 
and on crowdsourcing 
Wikistrat’s platform, 
to suggest core 
components, rank 
them by importance 
and develop 
scenarios together 
C - framework to thinking and creating 
scenarios about future crimes and terror 
attacks relying on the Internet of Things 
(IoT), and to present a crowdsourcing 
research based on this thinking, which 
resulted in both high- and low-probability 
scenarios with dramatic impact 
65 Wardman & 
Mythen (2016) 
Conceptual   A, C The associated task is to adopt a more 
expansive and critical view of 
communicative responses to black swans. 
66 Werther (2013) Conceptual   A Critique:  
- Some Taleb’s examples does not follow 
his own black swan idea 
- Black swans can be forecasted 
4. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
In this section, the literature will be divided to three previously mentioned categories by 
themes for closer analyze. Only the relevant findings for the literature review are 
examined and included to this section due to space restrictions.  
 
First part of this section, which examines theoretical aspects of black swans, tries to create 
a functional picture how black swan concept is seen in the scientific field and how the 
concept has evolved since Taleb introduced it for the first time. Second part examines 
black swans effect. In this part, articles and researches which examined the effects after 
the black swan events from the literature are analyzed closer. The purpose is to form a 
general understanding how black swan can affect to its environment. Third part examines, 
can black swan be prevented and if it can, which methods can prevent them. In the 
beginning of part two and three, the part’s specific theoretic groundwork is revisited. 
 
 
4.1 Studies related to theoretical aspects 
 
When examining theoretical aspects of literature, it’s helpful to divide the theme to two 
different sequent. To literature which broadens and supports with the black swan concept, 
and to literature which disagrees with it at some level. 
 
At first, it’s interesting to note that there was not any intended indication in the literature 
which would have been disagreeing with Taleb’s world view. This should mean that most 
of the scientific field, where the literature was collected, accepts world as a 
nondeterministic or teleological, dynamical complex system. This cannot be taken as a 
huge revelation, since deterministic world view is not precisely known as scientific one, 
but it’s an interesting side note. This should also indicate that critique against black swan 
concept is mostly addressed toward Taleb’s own nuances than the black swan concept 
itself, due to highly similar world view where world is seen as a dynamic entity. 
 
Reviews literature circles efficiently around theme of nondeterministic and questions, if 
future can be predicted from the past. According to Davidson (2012), economic system 
is nonergodic which means that predicting the future by examining the average past is 
inefficient or maybe even impossible. Borisom and Hamm (2010) takes it even further in 
their research, where was found, that fact-alone perspective provides no effective 
guidance on issues if there are little or no frequency data. Unlimited faith in historical 
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data can lead to overconfidence and excessive risk taking. A system based solely on 
historical fact will inevitably lurches from crisis to crisis. According to them, Bayesian 
inference method is often a superior method when past is analyzed to predict the future. 
Terzi’s (2010) article agrees with the notion that past observations are often too small 
sample size to predict probability of extremely rare events. Schurr, Rodensky and Erev’s 
(2014) research revealed two contradictory effects: direct studies of experienced utility 
reflect overweighting the peak (rare and most extreme) experience, but studies of 
decisions from experience reflect underweighting of the peak and reliance on the frequent 
experiences. These four researches support with Taleb’s assumption that past events 
cannot be used to predict future events precisely and the predictions can be misleading 
due a subjective researcher (Taleb 2007: 84, 190). 
 
Milanesi, Guercini and Waluszewski (2016) studies dynamism further in their research. 
They notice that change appears to be the product of antecedents affecting the dynamics 
of specific relations, which are an important factor in causing change in business 
activities; they may be positive or negative, but they are always decisive. Black Swan, 
appears less surprising when interpreted through an interactive approach, focused on the 
possibilities and constraints of relational processes across time and space. 
 
Also, the meaningfulness of prediction is also questionable. Higgins (2013) noted in his 
study how almost every expert appeared to miss the start of the global financial crisis in 
2008. His researches statistical tests showed inconsistencies with the expert forecasts to 
actual performance and he concluded, that sometimes simple “no change” forecast was 
better than experts. Taleb himself sees that it’s useless to try to prevent black swan, but 
organization should establish themselves a black swan proof. Schurr et al. (2014) study 
revealed that planning is sensitive to rare events, but they are underweighted in on going 
decision making. Results could explain why emerging issues are problematic if they 
caused by rare event. 
 
Review’s literature gives several suggestions and process Taleb’s definition of black 
swans further. One of the biggest disagreement in black swans is can they be seen and 
protect against before they happen. Bogle (2008) agrees with Taleb, that black swans are 
unavoidable. Foresighting and preventing black swans will be review more thoroughly in 
section 4.3. Davidson (2010) compares Nassim Taleb’s “black swan” argument regarding 
uncertainty is equivalent to Frank Knight’s epistemological concept of uncertainty.  
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Teleological aspects of black swans are also strongly present in the literature. Makridakis 
and Taleb (2009b) have defined more specifically teleological aspects of black swans in 
their article. They point out that people reflection to black swan events may affect to the 
final outcome and how globalism which have connected the world, might actually make 
black swan more common and powerful. Chawla et al. (2012) agrees with Taleb’s view, 
that modern technology adds information and capital flows which may increase. Ashta 
(2016) points out in his article, which examines micro-loans in India, how black swans 
can be teleological and be caused by politicians or government by setting specific law or 
regulations. This suggestion will mean black swans can be caused by either deliberately 
or accident action. Seeing black swans as a production of manmade active or passive deed 
might be important. Mueller et al. (2016) have made similar observation teleological 
connections and describes, how reactions to events can decide if the event itself 
transforms into black swans due to an aggressive reaction. 
 
Taleb’s has made some significant adds to his second and renewed edition, which the 
subjectivity of black swans might be the most important. Flage and Aven (2015) supports 
this and notes that subjectivity of black swans solidifies the concept. Millett (2010) 
recognize the same as Flage and Aven, and adds the new barbell investing strategy which 
was also new add to the second edition. In barbell strategy (Taleb 2013:257-258), the 
investor is both hyper-conservative and hyper-aggressive at same time and invests 
approximately 85-90% of the funds to extremely safe investment instruments, like 
obligations, and invests the rest to highly speculative options in small portions to gain as 
high as possible lever. According to Taleb, doing this should prevent effects of possible 
black swans, because the basic level of investments will not be affected due safe hyper-
conservative investments. 
 
From the literature rises also a couple of terms similar to black swan which may be useful 
starting point in future research. Makridakis, Hogarth and Gabe (2009a), uses coconut 
and subway allegory to identify two different types of uncertainty. The delay of subway 
means often happening event with small consequence. Where coconut falling to a 
person’s head represent, black swanish like, rare event with huge consequence. Flage et 
al. (2015) compares black swans to term unknown unknowns, which was first used by 
Donald Rumsfeld in 2002. Unknown unknowns are unexpected events which cannot be 
predicted just like black swans. Term know unknown is an event what is known but 
predicting when the event will happen is impossible. They relate term known unknown 
to grey swans and emerging risks.  
 
 39 
One theme which is heavily emphasize by both Follain (2013) and Terzi (2010), is the 
need for extensive outlier work to understand rare events better. Outliers should not be 
chased by the price of high probability events. Outlier research could be helped by the 
fact that in the field of risk management, the interest toward black swans is rising 
according to Mikes (2011). The directions discussed for future research encourage both 
theoretical and methodological innovations within organizational risk research (Miller 
2009). Mueller et al. (2016) agrees with the importance of understanding extreme events.  
 
From Lettieri, Masella and Radaelli’s (2009) systematic review of can be found 
similarities between general disaster management and black swans. In both, the 
researched phenomenon is rare and has substantial effects. Of course, phenomenon’s 
rarity does not make it automatically a black swan. So, it can be argued that there are 
more connections to grey swans than black swans in disaster management due the more 
general nature of disasters.  
 
One aspect which is complete missing from the literature of the systematic review is the 
positive black swan phenomenon. Taleb focuses mostly on the negative side of black 
swans in his book but introduces the positive version quickly, almost as a side note (Taleb 
2013:78).  Reasons to bypass positive black swans can only be guessed, but they might 
be related to Taleb’s own book narrative which is heavily focused on negative sides of 
the black swan phenomenon.   
 
One aspect which rises again and again from the literature is the interest to relation 
between black swan and communication. There are several sources which believes that 
good organizational communication can reduce the effects of black swans or even prevent 
the event. This is an aspect to which Taleb does not believe, at least at the highest level. 
The associated task is to adopt a more expansive and critical view of communicative 
responses to black swans Wardman and Mythen (2016). Carmeli and Schaubroeck (2008) 
adds, the importance of learning from failures, which is critical to organization's crisis-
preparedness. They also point out that identifying weak signals correctly may help to 
foresee black swans’ effects. Black swan’s prevention aspects will be studied closer in 
later section. 
 
Critique which Taleb has faced can be basically sort out to two categories, can black swan 
be seen before they happen and problematic examples. Latter category of criticism 
pointed toward surprisingly toward black swan examples which Taleb mentions in his 
book. Both Allington et al. (2017) and Booth et al. (2008) argues correctly that 2007’s 
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financial crisis was not a black swan. They point out how the event does not follow 
Taleb’s own definition. But they miss the fact that even Taleb does not think fore mention 
event as a black swan (Taleb 2013: 379). The book Black swan: The impact of the highly 
improbable, is heavily related to 2007‘s financial crisis because it published at the same 
year as the crash began and some could argue the book offered an easy explanation for 
the event in the time when it was needed and so became the posterchild of the event. But 
the book was actually published before the market crash. At least in the literature for the 
systematic review, there was not any indication that Taleb would have called 
aforementioned financial crisis as a black swan at some point of time.  
 
Where Allington et al. (2017) and Booth et al. (2008) critique was toward a Taleb was 
singular example, Werther (2013) has larger issues with Taleb’s examples and declares 
many of Taleb’s own examples in the book, not as black swans at all, but they were 
forecast, and some of Taleb’s facts of examples black swans are inadequate or even 
wrong. Werther mentions Taleb’s Lebanon black swan example as a one. “The Lebanese 
‘paradise’ suddenly evaporated . . . a Black Swan coming out of nowhere transformed 
the place from heaven to hell” (Taleb, 2007). The implication is that nobody could see 
this coming. The truth is many did.” (Werther 2013). Werther has his points as some of 
Taleb’s black swans, like a turkey on a thanksgiving, can be quite creative, but even 
though some of Taleb’s examples can questionable that does not mean the concept is 
automatically faulty.  
 
 
4.2 Black swans’ effects 
 
4.2.1 Basics of black swan’s effect 
 
To understand why black swans, have so dreadful impact we must understand how black 
swan’s effect works. As Taleb has implicated, he believes causality. If black swan is 
studied under Taleb’s assumption, black swans can be linked to system theory, complex 
systems and chaos theory.  
 
It’s useful to understand the basics of system theory, complex systems and chaos theory. 
In system theory, every event is affected by several different events and factors. System 
theory’s guiding idea is that everything is formed from individual systems which interact 
with other systems. These systems can be parallel, like how cells interact together, or they 
can interact in hierarchy, like cell-tissue-organ-organism system. Complex system is how 
organism operates in system theory. In complex system, it’s impossible to be certain how 
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upper level systems operates by examining lower level systems. If event happens in a 
higher system, the effect is not necessarily same in lower system, i.e. the effects in system 
does not affect in linear manner. Complexity is seen as the source of sudden and 
unexpected changes. (Laukkanen 2013:58-59). Unexpected changes occur in bifurcation 
point where a factor affects to the event (Erikson 2013: 70-71). Complex systems do offer 
the base for chaos theory which explains how chaos is born in complex systems. It can 
be simplified to a situation where the rapid changes in systems makes it hard to predict 
the future state of that system due to a nonlinear effect. (Levy 1994).  
 
Limiting and controlling events’ effects has been studied extensively in literature. Ashta 
(2016) has noticed, that black swans are difficult to limit control which emphasize 
preparing them and their consequence. Olson et al. (2013) noticed in their research, how 
highly optimized supply chain networks are inherently risky, because they eliminate most 
of system’s slack to lower costs. Findings like theses do make sense because highly 
optimized systems do rely to other systems which rely to other systems and so on in 
system theoretic manner. When one fails, it will affect to those which it’s connected 
directly or indirectly.  
 
In short, Taleb and majority of review’s literature sees that black swan’s effect can 
spreads from system where it happened to other systems which are directly in touch with 
it, where it can spread the effect onwards to systems which are not directly in touch with 
the system where the black swan originally happened. Predicting the spreading and how 
the black swan affects is hard, and the effects of the event can change from system to 
system. 
 
 
4.2.2 How black swan affects systems 
 
Carmaser (2016) studied economies and exchange. According to him, economies where 
exchange rate co-movement for economies depend predominantly on trade is high, such 
economies are riskier and less resilient to crisis. Jovanović and Pilić (2017) studied the 
perceptions of ancillary risks and trade-offs. They are even more variable than the already 
often very contradictory perceptions of target risks directly pertinent to the respective 
technologies. The wish to develop and promote the technology in risk-adverse societies 
can result in blindness for ancillary risks. All in all, it looks like organizations which are 
more bound to systems around them are more dependent of well-being of those systems. 
These researches do support Taleb’s claim that globalization makes black swans more 
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common and powerful, since globalization create worldwide systems where black swans 
can spread easier than further than in local, and smaller, for example nationwide system.  
 
Rheinberger et al. (2017) studied people’s attitudes toward HILP catastrophes. They 
argue, that big catastrophes that are going to increase both in frequency and in size, which 
is relevant finding and is alarming especially since they also found out, that general risk 
assessment is often inadequate and do not include important dimensions such as the sheer 
size of a catastrophe or the disutility of bereavement. Research adds, general catastrophe 
aversion is not constant, but it changes by system. Study did not link up with Taleb’s 
black swan concept officially, so its statement about increasing number of big 
catastrophes should not be taken as a testimony for Taleb’s claims that globalism 
strengthens black swans.   
 
Black swan events have also been studied from markets’ point of view. Studies connected 
to markets have often been easier to analyze due exact data. Estrada (2009) studied US 
stock market and noticed that large daily swings that did have a significant impact on 
long-term performance, meaning black swans have a massive impact on long-term 
performance. These long-term performance issues could be explained with problems 
which spread through systems. Terzi’s (2010) research made a notice, that outliers are 
always possible, and they are a risk to investment portfolios and for the entire banking 
system.  
 
One instance, which is interested of black swans’ effects, is investors. This can be seen 
from literature, where are heavily connections to several markets. Ajmi et al. (2014) 
studied how oil prices and MENA stock markets interact, they found out they interact in 
a nonlinear manner. The signs of changes in the causing variables are important for 
detecting the true causality links between the variables. The nonlinear causality does 
change from case to case.  
 
Investors have been searching optional investing methods to diminish the effects of black 
swans’ in their portfolio and popularity of precious metals has increased. Almudhaf et al. 
(2017) studied, could investing in precious metals to prevent black swan’s effect. They 
found out that even though black swans do affect them, the value will return. They draw 
a conclusion, that best timing for the purchase is impossible to predict, so buyers should 
hold all the time. Bekiros, Boubaker, Ngyen and Uddin (2017) shares these views and 
adds investing in gold is becoming more popular and it reduces fluctuation in the long 
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run. Gold acts as a diversifier both normal and bear markets in the BRICS countries, but 
they add that it is not a hedge or a safe haven for investments. 
 
Even Taleb (Taleb 2013:372) himself identified climate change in his book and if black 
swan is seen in system theoretic view that make all the sense, since climate is connected 
to everything. Climate change has also been identified in systematic review’s literature. 
Dietz (2017) has studied climate change in economic point of view.  He points out, that 
economic analysis of climate change depends greatly on low-probability high-impact 
events. A regional catastrophe is likelier than a global. Regions most likely to suffer a 
catastrophe are India and Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East, and Latin America, 
the only region to escape a catastrophe altogether is the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. There are several other potential catastrophes which are much less noticed. If 
climate change is seen as a black swan, these are aspect which should be taken notice. 
Knudsen (2010) opportunistically points out that environment movement might benefit 
from 2007 black swan financial crisis, if global warming is seen as a similar event which 
should be taken seriously. 
 
Siomkos (1999) has examined the effects of product related repercussions in his studies. 
Even though he has not studied them connected directly to black swans, his findings are 
generally useful even without black swans and they may offer directions for later black 
swan research. Siomkos found out consumers link manufacturers product liability directly 
to manufacturers reputation. Meaning generally organizations with good reputation are 
held more accountable for same failures than organizations with worse reputation. 
Siomkos noticed, that taking responsibility for mistakes reduce customers outrage toward 
organization. Preventive actions, as making re-call, do lessen responsibility in the face of 
customers even if failure would happen. Organizations which faces positive external 
effects during a crisis will be held the least responsible for the harm they might have 
caused. Siomkos research suggests, that taking responsibility of black swans, if they are 
self-inflicted, in some cases might help organization to overcome its difficulties in the 
long run. 
 
 
4.3 Foreseeing black swans 
 
Question, can black swan be foreseen, is important because it determines how do 
organization prepares for them. In views, where they cannot be seen, the emphasis leans 
toward building an organization which is dynamic enough to evade them or robust enough 
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to endure them. In views, which believe they can be seen, the emphasis is on preventing 
them or their consequence.  
 
 
4.3.1 Preparing to unnoticeable black swans 
 
In his book, Taleb presents a view that attempts to prevent black swans happening are 
useless waste of resources. Trying to prevent them is impossible because they cannot be 
seen in time to prevent them (Taleb 2013:264). Makridakis et al. (2009b) research shows 
further Taleb’s belief of causality and complexity. They argue that accurate forecast is 
possible but usually fails due a complexity, which basically make forecasting impossible 
if the question is even slightest complex. Bogle (2008) agrees with Taleb’s belief that 
black swans are impossible to protect against.  
 
Instead of trying to prevent black swans, Taleb’s suggests preparing for their effects. 
Makridakis et al. (2009b) gives seven-point guideline for actions in low predictability: 1. 
Avoiding the illusion of control, where understanding the lack of control will help the 
possible psychological stress. 2. Protective strategies, where understanding the lack of 
control may place an organization in risk, protective strategies protects organization from 
unpleasant events. 3. Being prepared. Makradakis’ and Taleb’s third advice suggests that 
organization should educate for their employees to prepared for possible events for 
minimizing wrong actions which may be harmful if an event comes true. 4. Proactive 
strategies, in which organization should prepare reserves which are required to continue 
its operations. 5. The VC approach, in venture capital approach, the organization 
diversifies their targets across a broad range of investments. 6. The maxmin approach, 
which goes one beyond the VC by seeking out large gains but at a fixed known cost (e.g. 
buying options or puts), while investing the great majority of the resources in minimal or 
no risk investments. 7. Concentrating on uncertainty, where uncertainty of future is 
accepted.  
 
Makridakis has studied uncertainty also without Taleb. Makradakis et al. (2009a) 
examined assessed uncertainty in their article. They make special notice how human 
nature almost always downgrade the risk under the real estimation. They narrow seven-
point guideline to three. 1. Ignoring the facts is not an option, and organizations should 
accept the existence of uncertainty. 2. Assessing the level of uncertainty and the possible 
outcomes. 3. Augment the range of uncertainty what is considered in the previous step. 
Whatever the assessment is, it’s probably an underestimated the true level of uncertainty.   
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4.3.2 Tools and methods to foresee black swans to prevent them 
 
Even though Taleb firmly believes that preventing black swans is impossible, it’s useful 
to question the assumption if they can they be foreseen. If they can, it’s possible that some 
of them might even be prevented. There were several opposing views for the issue in the 
literature and several methods were used which could help revealing black swans as a 
whole or partially. This part present tools and methods which are believed to be linked to 
foreseeing black swans in different fields of operation. Also, the possible outcomes of 
these experiments are included. 
 
Communication in different forms was one suggested method to prevent black swans 
which mentioned often in the literature. Maslen and Hayes (2016) believes black swans 
can prevented via information sharing. Both the processes of mediation and 
synchronization require social practices to transfer, translate, transform, and distribute 
knowledge between people. If Maslen’s and Hayes’ research is taken as an option, 
organization should pay special attention to how knowledge is translated, because 
Christiansen and Thrane (2014) study shows that risk reports do transfer information 
between organizational levels, but frontline managers can add a political nuance to risk 
which could change the tone of the information. Lindaas and Pettersen (2017) shares same 
view as Maslen and Hayes and think, it’s possible to predicting black swans. According 
to their research, a broadening of approaches, including like communication, can 
contribute to improved predictions. However, communication does not always help to 
recognize possible black swans but might actually prevent the recognition in the case of 
negative group thinking. Wardman et al. (2016) sees that black swans are hard to detect, 
and the associated task should to adopt a more expansive and critical view of 
communicative responses to black swans. Carmeli et al. (2008) points out that identifying 
weak signals correctly may help to foresee black swans’ effects. Learning from failures 
is critical to organization's crisis-preparedness.  
 
Masys (2012) tested, could scenario planning or red teaming make black swans visible. 
Because these methods do not predict precise future, but bunch of them, they cannot 
reveal precise black swans. They theoretically can reveal grey swans, if the future is 
predicted correctly. According to Markmann, Darkow and Gracth (2012), the Delphi 
technique has been found to be helpful in examining uncertain world events. They also 
add Delphi method can assist in reducing uncertainty and thereby the companies' 
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susceptibility and vulnerability to various kinds of disruptions. Delphi method could 
provide optional approach to discovering black swans.  
 
Jebari (2014) have examined black swans from engineering point of view and believes 
that engineer’s safety concept or safety barriers could provide answers to black swan 
extinction events. The limitations for this article are obviously huge due to specific 
starting point and Jebari’s methods might work only in a couple of sectors.  Nafday (2009) 
offers four ways to survive a black swan organization’s structure point of view: 
Prevention strategies, Risk-Reduction strategies, Risk Transfer Strategies, Design-Based 
Strategies In prevention strategies, the major emphasis is on preventing black swans. 
They are tried to avoid by choosing operation site and procedures correctly, using barriers 
and training to prevent or minimize black swans. In risk-reduction strategies, the potential 
risk is limited specific part which can be quarantine if needed. This is done with system 
response control or with some other technological devise. In risk transfer strategies, the 
risk minimized by transferring it with insurances, contracts or sovereign warranty to 
second party. In designed-based strategies, the organization is constructed so that it can 
survive a black swan, e.g. system resilience through robustness or redundancy. Paltrinieri, 
Khan and Cozzani (2015) emphasis the need of safety culture and decision-making 
processes capable to deal dynamically with emerging and increasing risk issues. 
 
Where most literature was focused discovering black swans. Akkermans and Wassenhove 
(2013) studied how grey swans can be discovered. Discovering grey swans should 
theoretically be easier than black swan because they are known events. Akkermans and 
Wassenhove identified four ways discover and avoid grey swans: 1. Early spotting, since 
the event is known, its warning signs are also known. 2. Fast decision-making, when risk 
is discovered the quick decision-making is crucial. 3. Agile supply network, is more 
elusive against threat. 4. Focused research, it’s needed to make sure that whatever 
research is develop from observations in practice, it does not gradually drift away from 
practice and become irrelevant. 
 
One sector which have tried to find an answer to black swans is financing. Methods which 
are used in financing, probably does not work at organizational level. Follain (2013) has 
studied outliers and thinks, that ongoing stress test and new adjusted rules to market could 
protect against upcoming financial black swans and but adds that more extensive outlier 
research is needed. In his study, Langley (2013) notices that SCAP (Supervisory Capital 
Assessment Program) has techniques to ensure preparedness for “black swans” of HILP 
events. He sees, that both bank stress testing and catastrophe planning are 
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problematizations of the future that work primarily with uncertainties rather than risk 
probabilities. Aleskerov and Egorova (2012) tried to develop a model which could detect 
black swans from index, but their model was not functional. Instead it does detect grey 
swans and can utilize detections to generate small profit in the long run. Santos, Alves 
and Hammoudeh (2013) makes the recommendation to decision makers, that at times of 
extreme and rare events they should estimate market risk with HQ models such the 
DPOT- and Quasi- Port models which perform well with very small probability values. 
 
Hyung and Vries (2012) have studied the fat tail phenomenon which is well recognized 
and popularized as the black swan and they believe it could produce more focused 
portfolios. This could produce more protection against black swans. Hilal, Poon and 
Tawn’s (2011) approach addresses losses outside the range of the historical data and, so 
it’s a useful technique for estimating hedge ratios that emphasize the downside risk of a 
portfolio. Marsh and Pfleiderer (2012) have examined black swan from S&P index and 
have noted, that the surprise virtually disappears for S&P Index returns when it’s 
measured relative to the standard deviation of the conditional S&P distribution. Some 
models, enhanced information flows speed up contagion effects and systemic black swan 
events. Black swans are hardly immutable; nor does that moniker provide any insight is 
the becoming manageable or not. Olson et al. (2012) have noticed that black swan 
appeared in smaller economies stock index before in large ones during financial crisis. 
This should add interest to small economies for hint of a looming black swan. 
 
The interest toward studying black swans have increased in last years. Ilevbare, Probert 
and Phaal (2012), emphasize that successful risk management, must pay attention to 
uncertainty and try to recognize patterns outside standard risk management process. 
Mikes (2011) also points out risk management’s becoming role in black swan studies. 
Interest toward black swans has increased recent years. Over the last decade, a growing 
number of practitioners and commentators have been recasting a firm’s strategic, IT, 
legal, and compliance uncertainties as additional and distinct risk categories. Risk 
management’s fields interest toward recognizing black swans should produce more black 
swan research.  
 
One method which could potentially reveal black swans at least in supply chain, maybe 
even elsewhere, was identified as Bayesian network methodology. Lockamy has made 
extensive studies of Bayesian networks used in supplier selection to reach better supplier 
contact. The method identifies possible problems and tries to evade them. Lockamy 
(2011) suggests, Bayesian networks can be used as an effective benchmarking tool for 
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decisions regarding current and prospective suppliers based upon their potential impact 
on the buyer organization. According to Lockamy and McCormack (2012), Bayesian 
networks methodology can be used to develop supplier risk profiles to determine the risk 
exposure of a company’s revenue stream. The supplier risk profiles can be used to 
determine which risk events which have the highest impact and probability. There should 
be made a side note, that Lockamy does not directly connect Bayesian networks to black 
swans, but to similarities between them could grant a starting point for a mapping method 
which purpose would be searching black swans. This being said, using Bayesian network 
as profiler for identifying potential black swans or their effect is interesting but highly 
questionable due highly complex environment which would increase the number 
potential maps to too high for beneficial use. O’Donnell’s research reminds Lockamy’s 
view of Bayesian networks. O’Donnell (2005) conceptualized a system-thinking 
framework for COSO is somewhat related to Lockamy’s view. This framework identifies 
various events which could hinder the ability of a business unit to achieve its operating 
objectives. If this framework can identify events which affects to business units’ efficacy, 
maybe it could identify them also in the larger scale.  
 
Feduzi and Rundle (2014) argues, that Baconian method offers rational procedure for 
exploring possibilities. It shows how the processes of generating and evaluating 
hypotheses can play supporting roles. It provides the resources for developing 
prescriptive approaches to state space construction and that may help make inroads on 
the problem of organizations being blindsided by black swan. It’s highly questionable if 
Sir Francis Bacon’s scientific model from 1700’s is suitable method to identify black 
swans in modern society.  
 
4.3.2 Foreseeing and preventing nature’s black swans 
 
Black swans related to natural disaster should be approached differently than black swans 
which occur in society and are either man made or caused. Ding, Gerst, Bernstein, 
Howarth and Borrsuk (2012) studied how risk preference varied among cultures. One 
general note was that societies are substantially more averse to risk than typically 
assumed in integrated assessment models. Higher aversion to risk increases HILP-event 
prevention, which could mean organizations in higher risk aversion systems could 
possibly evade black swans easier than organizations in low risk aversion societies. 
Emblemsvåg (2008) noticed in his research that limited data of natural disaster do affect 
the accuracy of predictions. 
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Sheffi (2005), who has studied HILP events has made observation, believes that 
flexibility can protect companies against HILP events. Observations is similar compared 
to Talebs suggestions organizations should protect themselves against black swans by 
constructing their structure to be agile.  
 
Paltrinieri et al. (2017) have studied identifying dynamic risks from catastrophe aspect 
and especially Paltnieri has used Seveso sites in his researches which are heavily related 
to HILP events. In their study, Paltnieri et al. address dynamic risk analysis on different 
levels with complementary methods, to analyze collected data. They focus on dynamic 
hazard identification, dynamic analysis of initiating events, and dynamic analysis of 
consequences. Seveso sites can suggest further research subjects. Trakas, Hatziargyriou, 
Panteli and Mancarella (2016) studied power grid accidents and came to a conclusion that 
Severity Risk Index makes managing HILP events in power grid possible. Severity Risk 
Index could offer a partial method to monitor for other HILP-events.  
 
According to Paltrinieri, Tugnoli, Buston, Wardman and Cozzani (2013), DyPASI 
methodology, which is tool for Information Retrieval to Integration of HAZID Process, 
features as a tool to support emerging risk management process, having the potentiality 
to contribute to an integrated approach breaking “vicious circles”, helping to trigger a 
gradual process of identification of previously unrecognized atypical scenarios. Some 
HILP events and all black swan are atypical scenarios, which would offer a research 
possibility to create black swan recognizing tool. Tzezana (2017) suggests that the 
Internet of Things (IoT) framework do offer scenarios about future crimes and terror 
attacks relying on a crowdsourcing research based on this thinking, which resulted in both 
high- and low-probability scenarios with dramatic impact. Both Paltrieri et. al’s and 
Tzezana’s research could provide useful methods to organizations which study 
catastrophe based black swans. 
 
Räikkönen, Pilli-Sihvola, Kunttu, Yliaho, Jähi, Zuccaro and Cogliano’s (2014) study 
offers a practical approach for the economic assessment of long-term mitigation 
investments for crisis management, designed to support planning and decision-making.  
It covers the influence of economic impacts of mitigation measures and uncertainty on 
decisions. If Makridakis et al. (2009b) notion that people’s reaction can change the course 
of potential black swan is true, approaches which support decision making should be 
useful methods for potential black swan events. 
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4.4 Overall evaluation 
 
Even though the academic research of Nassim Taleb’s black swan concept is relatively 
young due to book’s publication date, the interest toward the concept has been huge. 
Recent research has been tried to define the black swan’s concept to be more precise and 
studied how the phenomenon could be prevented or mitigated. Before moving towards 
the directions for future research, some elements that characterize current research will 
be discussed.  
 
The majority of literature review’s articles were divided to quantitative, qualitative and 
conceptual articles where journals articles and literature reviews were in minority. All in 
all, there were 22 conceptual, twenty qualitative, 14 quantitative, nine journal articles and 
four literature reviews. The combined number of aforementioned articles, 69, is three 
more than number of reviewed articles because three articles used two types of study. If 
examined closer articles and articles’ types, there can been drawn some conclusions. First, 
most of the black swan articles are either conceptual or journal articles. This could 
demonstrate, how difficult transforming black swan concept to measurable form is. Most 
of the quantitative studies which examined black swans focused mostly to its effects 
which were easier to measure.  
 
Figure 2 (page 51) presents the most important findings of this literature review in one 
figure. It divides black swan concept to two aspects, theoretical and practical, so that the 
synthesized data can be presented as efficiently as possible. Theoretical aspects present 
findings from literature which are considered as core themes of the theoretical base of 
black swans. Practical aspects include findings which describes on how a specific black 
swan acts in system where it happens. Figure pays attention to the big picture of black 
swan’s mechanics meaning some smaller findings are included to subcategories due space 
restriction. Figure 2 is subjective, and it presents the author’s view of what is important. 
 
Theoretical aspects include theoretical ground, similar concepts and deciding factors. 
Theoretical ground presents black swan’s characteristics and theoretical concepts which 
guides black swan phenomenon. At theoretical ground, subjectivity (Flagge et al. 2015); 
outlier (Terzi 2010) and nondeterministic/teleological (Ashta 2016) describes black swan 
as a phenomenon. It is rare event, which is based mostly on a chance. It might be causal 
or teleological if there are be human related direct or indirect reasons why it happened. It 
is also subjective meaning some observers may foresee it. Theoretical ground’s other 
terms nonlinear, dynamical and system theoretic (Taleb 2013:216) describe why black  
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Figure 2: Findings categorisized by aspects  
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swan operates as it does. Black swan works in system theoretic matter, which includes 
complex systems and chaos theory. It is also nonlinear and dynamic. This explains, why 
emerging black swans can be difficult to predict and how black swan’s effect can spread 
to new systems. 
 
Similar concepts collect together commonly used concepts which are similar to black 
swan. HILP (Paltnieri et al. 2017), Unknown unknowns (Flagge et al. 2015) and Knight’s 
Epistomological concept of uncertainty (Davidson 2010) might offer the easiest starting 
point for study of similar concepts. Makridakis et al. (2009a) subway/coconut allegory 
was deliberately not included to the figure since it’s not commonly used. Deciding factors 
collects factors which either causes black swan’s or decides will event become a black 
swan. Some studies (e.g. Mueller et al. 2016) believes that the reaction to potential black 
swan event may decide how powerful the effects will become. Black swans are believed 
to become more common due globalization (Makridakis et al. 2009b).  
 
The most interesting part of deciding factors is the three origins of black swan. This thesis 
does separate the cause of black swan event to three different cause, to nature and both 
active and passive manmade black swans. This categorizing is based on possible 
teleological reasons which start a black swan and HILP events which are not caused by 
man. It must be emphasized that this categorization does exists only in this thesis and 
there were no similar descriptions in the literature. Nature’s black swans are usually HILP 
events which are not caused by the action of humankind, these kinds of events can be e.g. 
nature disasters or pandemics. This thesis categorizes, a passive black swan as an event 
which is unintentionally caused by humankind’s action, meaning deed’s purpose was not 
to start a black swan but the action evolved due the world’s dynamic nature into one, an 
example of such event is 2007 financial crash which started from collapse of American 
housing markets. The system where the event started and mistakes which caused it were 
made by man but still the event itself was unintentionally.  Active black swans is 
categorized in this thesis as black swan which were caused intentionally, an example of 
such event is 9/11 attacks.  
 
Practical aspects present how black swans affects, can they be prevented and what is 
known about black swans at practical level. What is known presents the facts which have 
discovered so far. HILP events are increasing (Rheinberger et al. 2017). Black swan does 
have long term impact (Estrada 2009) and their effect varies due the dynamical nature of 
black swans. Black swans are outliers and they are always possible (Terzi 2010).  
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Why it affects explains why black swan spreads to other systems even outside the system 
where the original black swan happened. Since black swan is phenomenon which follows 
system theoretic principles it can spread thought system linkages to other systems. 
Globalization has combined systems of markets and economies together which have 
made them more close and dependent on each other. This do increase the efficiency of 
economies, but it also makes them more vulnerable to effects and inefficiencies which 
spreads through systems. Combined systems create more opportunities to system specific 
failures which can evolve to a black swan and spread onwards. 
 
Sections, protection against invisible and visible black swans, combines found methods 
and practices which are believed to either protect against black swans or prevent them. 
Actions taken to either prevent or protect against black swans is tightly connected to the 
belief, can black swans be foreseen. If they can’t be foreseen, as Taleb believes, then 
organization can only protect itself against black swan either building a structure robust 
enough to outlast black swan or agile enough to evade it (Sniedovich 2012). If 
organization believes that black swans can be seen, then organization should try to 
identify emerging black swans using foresight tool. After specific black swan is found 
organization can either try to prevent black swan altogether from happening or protect 
itself against that specific black swan.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
5.1 Contribution 
 
By using a systematic methodology to identify 66 key articles, this systematic review 
examines black swans and related research in academic journals. This review offers a 
picture how black swan phenomenon is seen from the economic point of view and tries 
to broaden the view from economics to more universal view so that some of the more 
challenging question related to black swans could be answered in future research. The 
review of literature was divided to three group by theme to clarify the specific aspects of 
each segment. The first group dealt with the theoretical aspects and limitations of black 
swans. The purpose of the first group was to gather a collective set of black swan 
mechanics defining articles, which would explain the basic of black swans. The second 
group examined how black swans’ effect in the reviewed literature. The purpose of the 
second group was demonstrate how black swans can affect the systems where it happens. 
The third group examined the methods and tools which could foresee or restrict the effects 
of black swans. The purpose of the third group was to first demonstrate the both views of 
black swans and then examine the suggested methods or tools to either protect against 
black swans or prevent them. 
 
Black swan is often seen only as low probability and highly impactful event, as a mere 
pared down sentence of something what Taleb could have used to market his book. 
Understanding mechanics behind the popular black swan metaphor are often secondary 
thing for the great masses who use the term black swan. This review synthetizes studies 
which gives more scientific explanation for the phenomenon. The dilemma, are black 
swans foreseeable and therefore can organization protect itself against or even prevent a 
specific black swan, can be taken as a core contribution of this review. The reason why 
this is the core contribution, even though the review does not answer the question is the 
fact, that it is the question which determines how black swans should be handled. Also, 
if the question is answered, it would immediately set limits for future research.  
 
 
5.2 Managerial implications 
 
Even though review is theoretical, it offers insights that might be importance for managers 
in practice. Black swans could be categorized as the current flavor of the month. They are 
pop cultural phenomena at some level and they get a lot of cover time, meaning they can 
be seen as more common what they really are. In reality, black swan events have 
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happened ever since big bang and they will keep happening until the end of time.  The 
current study does not exactly know how to stop or prevent them and at organizational 
level Taleb offers different dynamic or robust protection solution to stop them. These 
suggestions are fine, but they might not be the answer for every organization. Overly 
preparing for an event which is uncertain and does allocate resources, which could be 
used elsewhere, can be harmful.  Most organizations probably cannot optimize 
themselves to a system which is built to outlast black swan, and even if they can, black 
swans are erratic, so the protection might not be sufficient after all. Contemplating 
emergency plans and saving a buffer for future emergencies is always useful, but losing 
a competitive advantage, due investing for uncertain event, cannot be viable strategy for 
long run. 
 
 
5.3 Future research opportunities 
 
In this section, possible future research opportunities are tried to be identified. Earlier 
theme-based classification is not used in this section because some of the opportunities 
do intersect several themes or are combination observations from different themes. 
  
One of the biggest problem and the biggest research opportunity which was discovered 
from literature is the problematic nature of the black swan concept. Because the term is 
defined by Nassim Taleb himself, it basically means black swan’s theoretical concept is 
also his own intellectual interpretation. Experts have criticized parts his work in several 
occasions. Where dissenting opinions are healthy thing in science, but the lack of specific 
theoretical base for black swans, evades the most important question, can black swans be 
foreseen? Extensive research, which would answer the question, can they be seen, would 
also set the base line for protecting against them. If they cannot be seen, as Taleb believes, 
the protection against them though foreseeing is just waste of resources, just like Taleb 
phrases it. On the other hand, if black swans can be foreseen, it would indicate that Taleb’s 
method to construct systems which are black swan proof might actually be the inefficient 
method and give competitive advantage to competitors whose systems are optimized 
without the efficiency loss used to possible black swan threat. This would clarify, should 
organizations protect themselves passively against possible upcoming black swans or is 
it possible to actively seek and protect against specific black swan.  
 
After answering the world view question, there would be guidelines for tools which are 
converting to seek black swans. Right now, the non-existent limits leave every suggestion 
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to same level without regarding is the suggested method viable or not. This is not 
necessarily a bad thing, but it complicates finding better methods.  
 
One of the most interesting ideas to find black swans, which were mentioned in several 
articles was the role of communication in identifying black swans. There are studies, e.g. 
Maslen et al. (2016) and Lindaas et al. (2017), which have showed at least in some level 
that communication could reveal potential black swans. Communication’s role in black 
swans could offer several research opportunities. One potential opportunity could be 
studying can emphasizing communication’s importance in current forecasting methods 
add the probability to find black swans in time. Method like Delphi, could maybe provide 
insights of potential black swans, if the information produced by one expert, is interpret 
correctly by another expert quickly enough. Second potential research opportunity, could 
be examining more thoroughly, what is the part of communication after the black swan 
has happened. This opportunity would need the assumption Makridakis et al. (2009b), 
that the reaction of people (or organization) can decide how black swan occurs. If indeed 
the reaction can change the event, preparing the in the right way could theoretically lessen 
the effect of the event and communication’s part could be define the mutual reaction and 
the time for the reaction. Third potential research opportunity could be defining a method 
or standard how relevant individual observations are gathered together and interpreted 
right. This research path could also be the most important direction.  
 
One potential future research topic could also be more specific separation between natural 
catastrophe which are seen as a black swan events and so called “manmade” black swans 
which happen and mostly affect manmade systems. First of all, dividing black swans to 
two different group would create limits to scientific research which would ease up setting 
up researches. Secondly, this would help creating forecasting tool research by setting 
more precise targets where the founded method should work. 
 
As there are connection to teleological aspects (e.g. Ashta 2016) of black swans and there 
are several black swans, like 9/11 or 2007 financial crash, which were caused by people 
or organizations, it is fair to question could black swans be weaponized for organizational 
use. Theoretically an organization could create a manmade black swan to whom effects 
it would be immune since it has been created by it and should have protected itself against 
black swan’s effects. Of course, it might be ethically frown upon and due to the complex 
nature of black swans the outcomes of the event could be hard to predict even it would 
be a designed black swan. But organizational competition is tough in some industries and 
shutting down rival’s core process could create an excellent competitive advantage. 
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One possible future research opportunity could be the positive black swans which were 
completely ignored in the literature and even Taleb (2013:78) mentioned them casually 
in his book. The more extensive outlier research, which importance Follain (2013) 
emphasized, could provide useful information when outlier, in this case a positive black 
swan, is a major enough to pursue. In general, understanding outliers better could answer 
are they worth of pursuing or are the wasted resources greater than the possible reward. 
 
One valuable research topic could be further examining Taleb’s (2013: 280) claims that 
globalization produce and speed ups black swans. One specific research line could study 
how black swans contaminates systems which it hits. Perhaps an interesting starting point 
for a study like that could be following Olson’s et al. (2012) notion that some black swan 
is first viewable in smaller economies. This assumption could provide a smaller and 
therefore easier system to analyze. 
 
 
5.4 Limitations  
 
There are several limitations regarding this article. First, even though the reviewed 
literature was systematic, the fit of the articles was subjectively evaluated. Meaning, it is 
possible that some relevant articles may have been left out of the review literature. 
Second, the literature search was related to business and organizational related categories. 
Meaning there can be highly relevant black swan articles which were outside the sample 
and was not found in the search. Third, the extracted literature was narrow regarding some 
themes. Meaning that some of the conclusions has been done with relatively small number 
of supporting articles. This means some conclusions are strictly connected to very narrow 
views.  
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